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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-PSYCHIC INJURY HELD COMPENSABLE
WITHOUT PROOF OF PHYSICAL INJURY OR IMPACT.-The complaint
stated that the infant plaintiff was placed in a chair lift at a
ski center by a state employee who did not properly lock the
safety belt. As a result, the plaintiff became frightened and
hysterical on the descent and now seeks to recover damages for
the consequent "emotional, neurological disturbances with residual
physical manifestations." The New York Court of Appeals, in
a four to three decision overruling Mitchell v. Rochester Ry.,'
held that one can recover for injuries resulting from fright negli-
gently caused, without the necessity of showing immediate physical
injury or contemporaneous impact. Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237,
176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961).
There is some scientific foundation for the proposition that
severe emotional disturbance can cause physical injury. 2  For
example, in a case where A negligently causes B to be put in
great fear for her life, the fright could cause B subsequently
to suffer a miscarriage or some physical impairmept. The modern
English view 3 and the American majority rule 4 would allow B
to recover for the injuries resulting from her fright. The New
York courts, on the other hand, up to the time of the instant case
were governed by the decision of the Court of Appeals in 1896
in Mitchell v. Rochester Ry.5  There, while the plaintiff was
waiting to enter one of the defendant's horse cars, another of
the defendant's cars which was coming down the street veered
to the right. The team of horses came so close to the plaintiff
that when they were stopped she stood between the horses' heads.
It was alleged that as a consequence of the fright plaintiff suffered
a miscarriage. The court denied her recovery, since there was
no immediate physical injury. The court reasoned as follows:
(1) since there could be no recovery for the fright itself, there
could be none for the consequences of it; (2) the miscarriage
was not the proximate result of the defendant's negligence;
(3) to permit recovery would lead to a flood of litigation whereifi
1 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
2 See Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability
for Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. Rar. 193, 212-26 (1944).
3 Owens v. Liverpool Corp., [1939] 1 K.B. 394 (C.A. 1938); Hambrook
v. Stokes Bros.,'[1925] 1 K.B. 141 (C.A. 1924); Dulieu v. White & Sons,
[1901] 2 K.B. 669. The older English view denying recovery was expressed
in Victorian Ry. Comm'rs v. Coultas, [1888] 13 App. Cas. 222 (P.C.).
4 1936 LaG. Doc. No. 65, N.Y. LAw RavisioN Comm'N REP. (E) 32-35;
McNie&, Psychic Injuryi and Tort Liability in New York, 24 ST. JOHN's
L. Rsv. 1, 15-16 (1949). See, e.g., Lindley v. Knowlton, 179 Cal. 298,
176 Pac. 440 (1918); Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231, 21 A2d 402
(1941).
5 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
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claims could easily be feigned and damages would be too speculative
to estimate. The present Court has regarded the first two reasons
as having little weight.6
The Mitchell rule has been "watered down" by many ex-
ceptions. 7  Two closely allied exceptions, and perhaps the most
frequently applied, are the "immediate physical injury" cases
and the "slight impact" cases. Maloney v. Knickerbocker Ice Co.8
is illustrative of the first exception. There the plaintiff, frightened
and seeking to avoid being hit by a runaway horse, turned and
broke his leg. Another example of this exception is found in
Comwtock v. Wilsong, in which the defendant's automobile collided
with that of the plaintiff's testatrix. Shortly after the latter got
out of her automobile, she fainted, fell to the pavement, fractured
her skull and died. In these two cases, wherein recovery was
allowed, the defendant's negligence caused an emotional impact
upon the plaintiffs which immediately led to their injury. It should
also be noted that recovery has been allowed under the "im-
mediate injury" exception in a situation where plaintiff, present
at the scene, suffered fright at the sight of a close relative's being
placed in imminent danger.10
The "slight impact" cases came into play where the defendant
not only caused the plaintiff to be frightened but also caused
there to be inflicted upon him some impact or battery.1 In
earlier cases, the New York courts tended to be strict as to the
causal connection between the impact and the resultant injury,
and it was said that the impact, not merely the fright, must
be a cause of the injury.:2 If the causal relation existed, damages
GBattalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34(1961).
7 For a discussion of the exceptions to the New York rule, see McNiece,
supra note 4, at 32-68.
8229 App. Div. 317, 241 N.Y. Supp. 160 (1st Dep't 1930).
p257 N.Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431 (1931).
10 Cohn v. Ansonia Realty Co., 162 App. Div. 791, 148 N.Y. Supp. 39
(1st Dep't 1914). H-ere, a mother saw her children ascending in an elevator
with no operator and with the door open. She was so frightened that
she fainted and fell into the elevator shaft.12 The following are "slight impact" cases: Sawyer v. Dougherty, 286
App. Div. 1061, 144 N.Y.S.2d 746 (3d Dep't 1955) (memorandum decision)
(hit by blast of air filled with glass and wooden splinters); Powell v.
Hudson Valley Ry., 88 App. Div. 133, 84 N.Y. Supp. 337 (3d Dep't 1903)
(slight burn); Wood v. N.Y. Cent. & H.R.R.R., 83 App. Div. 604, 82 N.Y.
Supp. 160 (4th Dep't 1903), aff'd nem., 179 N.Y. 557, 71 N.E. 1142
(1904) (jolting of buggy and impact against seat); Buckbee v. Third Ave.
R.R., 64 App. Div. 360, 72 N.Y. Supp. 217 (2d Dep't 1901) (electric shock);
Jones v. Brooklyn Heights R.R., 23 App. Div. 141, 48 N.Y. Supp. 914 (2d
Dep't 1897) (struck on temple by incandescent bulb).
12 Hack v. Dady, 142 App. Div. 510, 127 N.Y. Supp. 22 (2d Dep't 1897).
The court said: "[I]t is established in this State that in an action for
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could be recovered for injuries resulting both from the fright
and the impact. Later decisions displayed a more liberal
tendency,13 so that New York seemed in accord with those jurisdic-
tions which allowed recovery for injury due to fright so long
as some impact was present, no matter how inconsequential."
The justification for the requirement of some impact upon which
recovery could be tacked was said to lie in the fact that the impact
was a guarantee of the bona fides of the claimant.15 In summary,
although New York had allowed recovery for psychic injuries
negligently caused when there was some impact or immediate
injury, its overall espousal of non-recovery marked it as a minority
jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals in the instant case grounded its rejection
of the Mitchell case on the following considerations. First of all,
the Mitchell case runs counter to the current of modern thinking
in the area. As the Court says:
[I]t is well to note that [the Mitchell doctrine] has been thoroughly
repudiated by the English Courts which initiated it, rejected by a majority
of American jurisdictions, abandoned by many which originally adopted it,
and diluted, through numerous exceptions, in the minority which retained
it. Moreover, it is the opinion of scholars that the right to bring an
action should be enforced.' 6
Secondly, the law should provide a remedy, so the Court argues,
for every substantial wrong. It is not for the court to say as a
matter of law that a negligent act cannot be the proximate cause
of psychic injury.17  Rather it is for the jury to say whether
a particular negligent act proximately caused an injury. Thirdly,
in answer to the argument that to allow recovery would encourage
negligence there cannot be recovery for mere fright or for injuries that are
the direct consequence of it . . . and I think that a recovery may not
be had in an action for negligence for consequences attributable to fright
alone, or to shock alone, merely upon proof that there was a bodily injury
coincident with that fright or that shock, but it must appear that .there
was some causal relation between the bodily injury and the fright or shock."
Id. at 513, 127 N.Y. Supp. at 25. Accord, Jones v. Brooklyn Heights R.R.,
supra note 11.
'3 Comstock Y'. Wilson, 257 N.Y. 231, 177 'N.E. 431 (1937); Sawyer v.
Dougherty, 286 App. Div. 1061, 144 N.Y.S.2d 746 (3d Dep't) (memorandum
decision), motion for leave to appeal denied, 309 N.Y. 1032 (1955) ; Tracy
v. Hotel Wellington Corp., 175 N.Y. Supp. 100 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd nem.,
188 App. Div. 923, 176 N.Y. Supp. 923 (2d Dep't 1919); see 1936 Laa.
Doc. No. 65, N.Y. LAw RF-iSION Comm'N REP. (E) 56-59; McNiece,
supra note 4, at 57-58.
'-1 Homans v. Boston Elevated Ry., 180 Mass. 456, 62 N.E. 737 (1902);
Gillogly v. Dunham, 187 Mo. App. 551, 174 S.W. 118 (1915).
15 Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N.Y. 231, 239, 177 N.E. 431, 433 (1931).
16Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 239, 176 N.E.2d 729, 730, 219
N.Y.S.2d 34, 36 (1961).
7 Id. at 240, 176 N.E.2d at 730, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 36.
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the bringing of fictitious suits, the majority states that a court
should not be swayed by arguments of mere expediency. A logical
legal right cannot be denied because there is danger of recovery
for feigned injuries in some cases.' Moreover, accidents and
injuries can just as easily be feigned in the "slight impact" cases
and in other exceptions to the rule. Because of the rule and
its numerous exceptions, not only are claimants tempted to perjure
themselves so as to fit within the ambit of a particular exception,
but honest claimants are penalized by their unwillingness to do
likewise.' 9 Finally, as to the argument that damages are speculative
and difficult to prove, the Court answers:
In many instances, just as in impact cases, there will be no doubt as to
the presence and extent of the damage and the fact that it was proximately
caused by defendant's negligence. In the difficult cases, we must look to
the quality and genuineness of proof, and rely to an extent on the con-
temporary sophistication of the medical profession and the ability of the
court and jury to weed out the dishonest claims.20
The dissenting members of the Court argue on purely practical
grounds. They express concern over the fact that the scope
of actionable negligence and the amount recovered in such actions
are growing too large.2' They anticipate that the new rule will
be abused and pressed to an extreme.
Courts and juries become prone to accept as established fact that fright has
been the cause of mental or physical consequences which informed n'edical
men of balanced judgment find too complicated to trace. Once a medical
expert has been found who, for a consideration, expresses an opinion
that the relationship of cause and effect exists, courts and juries tend to lay
aside critical judgment and accept the fact as stated.22
In conclusion, some order has now been put into a portion
of New York law heretofore complicated by numerous exceptions.
A claimant can now recover for psychic injury negligently produced
without the necessity of bringing himself within one of the
exceptions. However, many legal problems lie ahead in the area.
For instance, it has been said that an average person does not
usually ,suffer injury from psychic stimuli such as fright;
psychic injury is usually the sign of pre-existing disorder.23  As
'
8 Id. at 240-41, 176 N.E.2d at 731, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 37.
191d. at 241, 176 N.E.2d at 731, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 37.20 1d. at 242, 176 N.E.2d at 731-32, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 38.21Id. at 243, 176 N.E2d at 732, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 39 (dissenting opinion).
2 2 1d. at 244, 176 N.E.2d at 733, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 40 (dissenting opinion).23 McNiece, Psychic Injury and Tort Liability in New York, 24 ST.
JOHx's L. REv. 1, 78 (1949); Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and
Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REv. 193, 302(1944).
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a rule of law, one should not be responsible for his conduct unless
he could have reasonably foreseen that his conduct created an
unreasonable risk of danger to a norinal person.2 4  Therefore,
it has been said that persons with pre-existing disorders should
not recover in these cases at all, or should only recover for
damage due to an aggravation of their disorders.2 5  Such a view-
point would answer the objection that to allow recovery would
be too dangerous an extension of actionable negligence. New
York may find it necessary to lay down some specific restrictions,
such as the above, on the new rule.
)X
WILLS-PROBATE OF DESTROYED WILL-INSTRUMENT DE-
STROYED IN BOMBING RAID HELD "FRAUDULENTLY DESTROYED."-
Testator executed a will in Germany, deposited it with a notary
and never regained access to it or possession of it. The wil
was subsequently destroyed in an allied bombing raid, and the
decedent, with knowledge of such destruction, failed to revoke the
will. Upon testator's death petitioner sought to have the will
probated as one fraudulently destroyed under Section 143 of the
Surrogate's Court Act.' Testator's son unsuccessfully contested
the probate of the will in the Surrogate's Court. Upon appeal.
the Appellate Division, in reversing the Surrogate's Court, held
that the will had not been fraudulently destroyed because of
the testator's knowledge of the destruction.2  In a 4-3 decision,
the Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, held that
a will is considered "fraudulently destroyed" if its destruction
is effected by another without the testator authorizing or directing
the destruction. In the Matter of Will of Fox,. 9 N.Y.2d 400.
174 N.E.2d 499, 214 N.Y.S.2d 405 (1961).
In the absence of statute it is generally held that a properly
executed will which has not been revoked by the testator, and
24 See Smith, supra note 23, at 252-77.
25 McNiece, supra note 23, at 76-79; Smith, supra note 23, at 302.
1 N.Y. SuRR. CT. AcT § 143 provides: "A lost or destroyed will can
be admitted to probate in a Surrogate's Court, but only in case the will
was in existence at the time of the testator's death, or was fraudulently
destroyed in his lifetime, and its provisions are clearly and distinctly proved
by at least two credible witnesses, a correct copy or draft being equivalent
to one witness."
2 In the Matter of Will of Fox, 9 App. Div. 2d 365, 193 N.Y.S.2d 794
(1st Dep't 1959).
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